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PA CHIEFS OF POLICE ASSOCIATION
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BULLETIN
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WINTER 2016
www.pachiefs.orgLEGAL UPDATES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
stop, a police officer may obtain additional
information that causes his or her reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity to blos-
som into a determination of probable cause
that a vehicle contains contraband. See, e.g.,
Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)
(stating that the police officer's observation
during a valid traffic stop of items match-
ing the description of recently stolen items
and of passengers matching the description
of the suspects, provided probable cause to
seize the items without a warrant); cf. United
States v. Navedo, 694 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir.
2012) (noting that in Wardlow, "it was the
information that the police obtained dur-
ing the brief investigative stop that allowed
the brief Terry detention to blossom into
probable cause for arrest"). Moreover, po-
lice officers who conduct a Terry stop in a
situation in which they face potential danger
may shine a flashlight into a vehicle associ-
ated with the stopped individual. See United
States v. Tyson, 307 F. App'x 664, 667 (3d
Cir. 2009) (stating that, after [*18] police
officers conducted a legitimate Terry stop in
a high crime area at night, they were justified
in shining their flashlights into a car when
they discovered the handle of a firearm un-
der a seat).
The Government maintains that the officers
had probable cause to search the van pursu-
ant to the automobile exception because the
officers were in a high crime neighborhood,
Defendant was holding shotgun shells, the
officers had good reason to believe that there
was a shotgun in the van, and the shotgun
posed a threat to the public. Additionally, the
Government asserts that because the officers
could have reasonably concluded that their
safety, and the public's safety, would be put
at risk if they failed to search for the shotgun,
the officers were permitted to look into the
window of the van while conducting a valid
investigatory stop. See, e.g., Tyson, 307 F.
App'x at 667 (concluding that police officers
were justified in shining their flashlights into
the front seat area of a car that had previ-
ously been, and was soon to be, occupied by
the two individuals the officers had stopped
in an area in which gunfire had recently oc-
curred, and the location of the gun remained
unknown).
During the September 22, 2016 [*19] Hear-
ing, Defendant testified that the shotgun
was "invisible" after he hid it under his work
bin beneath the third row seat of the van.
(9/22/16 N.T. at 161-63, 182.) He claims
that, because the shotgun was hidden under-
neath these objects, Officer Filler could not
have seen the shotgun through the window
of the van. Defendant argues that if Officer
Filler did not see the shotgun in the van, the
officers lacked probable cause to believe that
the van contained contraband, the search
of the van was thus unreasonable, and the
shotgun must be suppressed pursuant to the
exclusionary rule. As we discussed supra note
1, we do not find Defendant's testimony to
be credible. Thus, we do not credit Defen-
dant's assertion that the officers could not
have seen the shotgun because it was hidden
under other items in the van.
As we discussed above, the officers had rea-
sonable suspicion that criminal activity was
taking place when they stopped Defendant.
During the course of the investigatory stop,
the officers learned two additional facts. First,
the officers noticed, that the car was locked
while its engine was running. (9/22/16 N.T.
at 69.) Second, Officer Filler viewed the
shotgun in the van by shining his flashlight
[*20] into the windows of the van. (Id. at
67.) The officers' concern for their safety was
significantly heightened after Officer Filler
confirmed the presence of a shotgun in the
van. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,
116 (1986) (finding the search of a car to be
justified under the Fourth Amendment due
to the danger to officer safety of allowing the
defendant to immediately return to his car
when there is a firearm in the car). The dan-
ger to the officers and the public was further
exacerbated due to the fact that the van was
left locked and running during the encoun-
ter. We find that these two additional fac-
tors, combined with the factors justifying the
officers' reasonable suspicion to conduct the
Terry stop of Defendant, established prob-
able cause for the officers to believe that the
van contained evidence of a crime and that
the shotgun in the running van presented a
potential danger to both the officers and the
general public. We conclude, accordingly,
that the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement applies in this case.
2. Plain View Exception
The Government also argues that, in addi-
tion to the automobile exception, the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement
justified the search of the van and the seizure
of the shotgun. Defendant [*21] argues that,
because the officers were not in a lawful posi-
tion to view the shotgun when Officer Lane
searched the van, the plain view exception
does not justify the warrantless search of the
van. Specifically, Defendant contends that
because Officer Filler did not see the shot-
gun through the window of the van while
shining his flashlight through the window,
the incriminating character of the shotgun
could not have been apparent prior to the
search of the van. As previously stated, we do
not credit Defendant's testimony regarding
the visibility of the shotgun in the van.
Under the plain view doctrine, evidence
that is inadvertently discovered by police of-
ficers may, under certain circumstances, be
seized without a warrant. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
Consequently, evidence that was seized
when it was lying in plain view will not be
suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary
rule, provided that (1) the officers did not
violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at
the place from which the evidence could be
plainly viewed, (2) the incriminating charac-
ter of the evidence is immediately apparent,
and (3) the officers have a lawful right to ac-
cess the object seized. Horton, 496 U.S. at
136-37.
Thus, the plain view doctrine "is best under-
stood 'not as an independent [*22] excep-
tion to the warrant clause, but simply as an
extension of whatever the prior justification
for an officer's access to an object may be.'"
United States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251, 257
(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 738-39 (1983)). In this case, Of-
ficer Filler did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment in arriving at the place from which the
shotgun could be plainly viewed since the
officers were engaged in a valid investigatory
stop. Moreover, Officer Filler credibly testi-
fied that the incriminating character of the
shotgun was immediately apparent to him as
he viewed the shotgun through the window
of the van with his flashlight; and Officer
Lane had a lawful right to access the seized
shotgun pursuant to the automobile excep-
tion due to the presence of probable cause.
See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37. Therefore,
we conclude that the Government has estab-
lished, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that because Officer Filler saw the shotgun
in plain view through the window of the
van, the officers were justified in searching
the van and seizing the shotgun. Thus, in ad-
dition to finding that the automobile excep-